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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                         
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Leatch Booker, III ("Plaintiff") was unlawfully 
terminated by Taylor Milk Company, Inc. ("Defendant").  As a 
result of this discharge, Plaintiff was awarded, inter alia, back 
pay; however, his request for prejudgment interest on the award 
was denied.  First, both Plaintiff, on appeal, and Defendant, in 
its cross-appeal, challenge the district court's order awarding 
back pay.  Second, Plaintiff appeals from the order of the 
district court denying his request for prejudgment interest.  The 
finding of unlawful termination is not challenged on appeal.  The 
district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
I. FACTS 
  Plaintiff, an African American, was employed as a 
probationary laborer and dock handler by Defendant.  Prior to the 
end of his period of probation, Plaintiff was terminated. 
Thereafter, he instituted this action against Defendant, and a 
number of other individuals (not involved in this appeal), 
alleging that his discharge was racially motivated.  After a 
bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Plaintiff 
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finding that his discharge was racially motivated and violative 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 
 In its judgment, the district court concluded that 
Plaintiff was entitled to, inter alia, back pay.  Although it 
awarded back pay, it reduced that sum by the amount it found 
Plaintiff could reasonably have earned elsewhere during the 
layoff period.1  Thereafter, Plaintiff made a motion for 
prejudgment interest on this back pay award, which was denied by 
the district court. 
 Plaintiff filed a timely appeal and Defendant a timely 
cross-appeal from the district court's orders. 
II. DISCUSSION 
 Plaintiff argues on appeal that the district court 
erred in finding that he essentially failed to mitigate damages 
after his discharge and in calculating the amount of the back pay 
award.  In addition, Plaintiff argues that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion for prejudgment 
interest.  In its cross-appeal, Defendant contends that because 
the court concluded that Plaintiff failed to fully mitigate 
damages as required by the statute, he is not entitled to any 
back pay.  We turn first to the district court's order awarding 
Plaintiff certain back pay. 
A.  The Back Pay Award 
                                                           
1In addition, the district court subtracted "interim earnings," 
which Plaintiff had earned in the various "odd jobs" he held over 
a four-year period between the wrongful discharge and his 
reinstatement with Defendant. 
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 If a district court finds that an employer has engaged 
in an unlawful employment practice, Title VII authorizes, inter 
alia, a back pay award. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); see also 
Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 558 (1988).  As explained  
by the Loeffler court, the back pay award authorized by Title VII 
"is a manifestation of Congress' intent to make `persons whole 
for injuries suffered through past discrimination.'" Id. (quoting 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975)); see 
Squires v. Bonser, 54 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 1995).  Despite a 
presumption in favor of a back pay award, see Albemarle Paper 
Co., 422 U.S. at 421, successful Title VII claimants have a 
statutory duty to mitigate damages. See Robinson v. SEPTA, Red 
Arrow, 982 F.2d 892, 897 (3d Cir. 1993). 
1. Plaintiff's Duty to Mitigate Damages 
 A successful claimant's duty to mitigate damages is 
found in Title VII:  "Interim earnings or amounts earnable with 
reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated 
against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise 
allowable." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); see Ellis v. Ringgold Sch. 
Dist., 832 F.2d 27, 29 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 
1005 (1990).  Although the statutory duty to mitigate damages is 
placed on a Title VII plaintiff, the employer has the burden of 
proving a failure to mitigate. See Robinson, 982 F.2d at 897; 
Anastasio v. Schering Corp., 838 F.2d 701, 707-08 (3d Cir. 1988). 
To meet its burden, an employer must demonstrate that 
1) substantially equivalent work was available, and 2) the Title 
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VII claimant did not exercise reasonable diligence to obtain the 
employment. See id. at 708. 
 Whether or not a claimant has met his duty to mitigate 
damages is a determination of fact, which is subject to the 
clearly erroneous standard of review. See Robinson, 982 F.2d at 
897; Ellis, 832 F.2d at 29.  In this case, the district court 
found that Defendant had established Plaintiff's failure to 
mitigate damages by a preponderance of the evidence and reduced 
the back pay award by the amount it found Plaintiff could 
reasonably have earned during the relevant period. 
 In support of its finding, the district court stated 
that "Defendant's Exhibit 14 and other evidence establishes [sic] 
that minimum wage jobs were available in the relevant job market 
for which Plaintiff was qualified.  Plaintiff did not apply and 
would have been hired if he did." Appendix at 91a.  Defendant's 
Exhibit 14 covers thirty-three months of the Beaver County Times' 
("Times") Sunday help-wanted section following Plaintiff's 
discharge.  The court did not specifically indicate what "other 
evidence" supported its conclusion.  Although the record is 
somewhat sparse, it is clear that the district court found from 
the record that 1) Plaintiff was not reasonably diligent in an 
effort to secure employment, and 2) there were substantially 
equivalent positions available.  We address these findings. 
a) Reasonable Diligence 
 The reasonableness of a Title VII claimant's diligence 
should be evaluated in light of the individual characteristics of 
the claimant and the job market. See Tubari Ltd., Inc. v. NLRB, 
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959 F.2d 451, 454 (3d Cir. 1992).  Generally, a plaintiff may 
satisfy the "reasonable diligence" requirement by demonstrating a 
continuing commitment to be a member of the work force and by 
remaining ready, willing, and available to accept employment. See 
Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1044 (7th 
Cir. 1994); Ford v. Nicks, 866 F.2d 865, 873 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 Plaintiff testified that he read the help-wanted ads in 
the Times every Sunday and "constantly and continuously searched 
for employment." Appendix at 23a-2 to 23a-3, 25a.  In addition, 
following his discharge, Plaintiff did earn approximately $2,000 
a year doing "odd jobs." Id. at 23a-1 ("handyman, painting, 
putting up fences, whatever").  Plaintiff also pointed out that 
he remained active with the Beaver Falls Job Service ("Job 
Service"), a local employment agency.  However, Plaintiff 
testified that in the three and one-half years following his 
discharge, he had failed to submit any employment applications in 
response to the Times ads and had only one job interview. See id. 
at 23a-2, 27a-28a.  Plaintiff has attempted, both during trial 
and on appeal, to explain his efforts. 
 First, Plaintiff stated that most companies will not 
accept job applications unless they are sent through the Job 
Service.  However, there is no evidence in the record to support 
Plaintiff's statement.  Furthermore, Defendant produced a number 
of help-wanted ads, which seem to be soliciting applications 
directly without reference to the Job Service. 
 In addition, Plaintiff argues that "[a]n examination of 
the grouping of advertisements [in Exhibit 14] reveals that the 
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vast majority of the listings are those of employment agencies 
and temporary agencies." Plaintiff's Br. at 10.  Because a number 
of agencies may list the same job and some list jobs so as to 
establish a file of available personnel, he maintains, merely 
counting the listings may serve to count the same job more than 
once.  Although some of the listings are from agencies, Plaintiff 
did not point to any ads which posted the same position or which 
listed a position that was, in actuality, not available. Further, 
Plaintiff did not support his statements concerning the temporary 
agencies' policies.  In fact, Plaintiff testified that in the 
past, he obtained employment through a temporary agency. 
 Although a plaintiff's efforts need not be successful, 
he must exercise good faith in attempting to secure a position. 
See Reilly v. Cisneros, 835 F. Supp. 96, 99-100 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
Here, it appears that Plaintiff did little more than register 
with the Job Service and look through the help-wanted ads. See 
EEOC v. Service News Co., 898 F.2d 958, 963 (4th Cir. 1990) 
("Looking through want ads for an unskilled position, without 
more, is insufficient to show mitigation, and the back pay award 
should accordingly be reduced."); Truskoski v. ESPN, Inc., 823 
F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (D. Conn. 1993) ("A ritualistic compliance 
with the unemployment administrator's work search requirement 
does not necessarily constitute a reasonably diligent search for 
suitable employment.").  Under the circumstances, Plaintiff's 
conduct following the unlawful discharge does not appear to 
demonstrate his continuing commitment to be a member of the work 
force. Cf. Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1497 (9th 
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Cir. 1995); Sellers v. Delgado College, 902 F.2d 1189, 1195 (5th 
Cir. 1990); Gallo v. John Powell Chevrolet, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 
804, 814 (M.D. Pa. 1991).  Thus, the district court's conclusion 
that Plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence does not 
appear to be clearly erroneous. 
 However, Plaintiff maintains that the Times help-wanted 
listings include postings for laborers, assembly workers, and 
factory workers, which are not "substantially equivalent" to his 
former position.  He argues that because they are not 
"substantially equivalent" he was under no duty to apply for 
these positions, and therefore, they should not be considered 
sufficient proof of his failure to mitigate damages.  We address 
that argument. 
b) Substantially Equivalent Employment 
 The duty of a successful Title VII claimant to mitigate 
damages is not met by using reasonable diligence to obtain any 
employment.  Rather, the claimant must use reasonable diligence 
to obtain substantially equivalent employment. See Ford Motor Co. 
v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982); Anastasio, 838 F.2d at 708. 
"Substantially equivalent employment is that employment which 
affords virtually identical promotional opportunities, 
compensation, job responsibilities, and status as the position 
from which the Title VII claimant has been discriminatorily 
terminated." Sellers, 902 F.2d at 1193; see Mitchell v. Humana 
Hospital-Shoals, 942 F.2d 1581, 1583 n.2 (11th Cir. 1991); Ford, 
866 F.2d at 873. 
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 The record demonstrates that Defendant employed 
Plaintiff as a "laborer" and "dock handler."  In those positions, 
he was essentially an unskilled worker who loaded and unloaded 
trucks and coolers.  Defendant's Exhibit 14 includes numerous 
postings for laborers, general laborers, light labor positions, 
and movers.  Although most of the postings do not include 
information about specific job responsibilities, benefits, and 
promotional opportunities, but see, e.g., Appendix at 36a, 43a, 
65a, it is clear that on the whole, the positions would not 
require Plaintiff to "go into another line of work, accept a 
demotion, or take a demeaning position." Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. 
at 231. But see Tubari Ltd., Inc., 959 F.2d at 458-59 (stating 
that it is reasonable for an unskilled worker to have accepted a 
wide range of work); id. at 456-57 (explaining that as time wears 
on, plaintiff may be required to lower his sights).  Furthermore, 
to the extent it is indicated, the compensation for the positions 
is substantially similar to Plaintiff's previous pay. Cf. Ellis, 
832 F.2d at 30. 
 The listings in Exhibit 14 appear to be substantially 
similar to Plaintiff's previous positions with Defendant. 
Therefore, the district court did not err in considering the 
exhibit as evidence of Plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages. 
 We are bound to accept the findings of the district 
court unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed. See In re Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108, 1113 
(3d Cir. 1995).  After reviewing the record, we conclude that the 
district court's finding that Defendant had proven Plaintiff's 
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failure to mitigate damages by a preponderance of the evidence is 
not clearly erroneous. 
 In its cross-appeal, Defendant argues that because 
Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages, he is not entitled to any 
back pay.  We turn now to that issue. 
2. Defendant's Cross-appeal 
 Defendant argues that because Plaintiff failed to 
mitigate damages to some extent, he wholly forfeits the right to 
back pay under Title VII.  The district court rejected 
Defendant's "no mitigation-no backpay" argument.  Because this 
issue involves the interpretation of section 2000e-5, our review 
is plenary. See Johnson & Johnson-Merck v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 
19 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 The plain language of section 2000e-5 shows that 
amounts that could have been earned with reasonable diligence 
should be used to reduce or decrease a back pay award, not to 
wholly cut off the right to any back pay. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(1); see also Tubari Ltd., Inc., 959 F.2d at 453-54; 
Anastasio, 838 F.2d at 708-09; 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 
§ 6.10(4), at 221-22 (2d ed. 1993).  Furthermore, Defendant's 
"no-mitigation-no back pay" argument is inconsistent with the 
"make whole" purpose underlying Title VII. 
 As explained supra, back pay is designed to restore a 
victim of discrimination to the economic position he would have 
enjoyed absent the unlawful discrimination.  The Supreme Court 
has instructed that "given a finding of unlawful discrimination, 
backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied 
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generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of 
[Title VII]." See Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 421.  Here, 
the district court found that even had Plaintiff successfully 
mitigated his damages, he would still not have been made "whole" 
absent the award of some back pay.  Based on the evidence before 
it, the district court concluded that the amount Plaintiff could 
have earned in a substantially equivalent position would have 
been less than what he would have earned in Defendant's employ. 
Thus, a denial of all back pay under the circumstances would 
frustrate the make-whole purpose underlying Title VII. 
 Defendant's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in 
Ford Motor Co. is misplaced.  In that case, the Court was 
addressing the following issue:  "[W]hether an employer charged 
with discrimination in hiring can toll the continuing accrual of 
backpay liability under . . . Title VII simply by unconditionally 
offering the claimant the job previously denied, or whether the 
employer also must offer seniority retroactive to the date of the 
alleged discrimination." See Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 220 
(footnote omitted).  Under that situation, a plaintiff can 
entirely, or nearly, mitigate any loss by accepting the job once 
denied, and, further, that rule satisfies Title VII's second 
goal─to end unlawful discrimination.  In the present case, there 
was no "Ford offer," and, as the district court found, even with 
reasonable diligence, Plaintiff could not have wholly mitigated 
damages.  This fact distinguishes his case from others where 
plaintiffs failed to seek jobs that would have compensated them 
completely for their losses and elected to remain unemployed. See 
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Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967, 981-82 (D.C. Cir. 
1990); Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 852 F.2d 688, 690 
(2d Cir. 1988).2 
 We conclude that the district court was correct as a 
matter of law in rejecting Defendant's "no mitigation-no backpay" 
argument and in awarding Plaintiff back pay where it was 
necessary to make him whole.  Although Plaintiff was granted back 
pay, he argues that the district court abused its discretion in 
calculating the amount of the award. 
3. Calculation of Back Pay 
 As stated, the district court reduced Plaintiff's back 
pay award by the amount he could have earned with reasonable 
diligence.  In calculating this amount, the district court turned 
to Defendant's Exhibit 14 -- the Times help-wanted ads.  The 
district court found that substantially equivalent positions were 
                                                           
2Defendant's reliance on Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 
(1941) and its progeny is also misplaced.  In Phelps the Court 
stated, "Since only actual losses should be made good, it seems 
fair that deductions should be made not only for actual earnings 
by the worker but also for losses which he willfully incurred." 
Id. at 198 (emphasis added).  Reading on, we think that by 
"losses willfully incurred," the Court was referring to "wages 
that might have been earned." See id.  Therefore, Phelps could 
fairly be read as holding that a deduction from back pay awards 
should be made for those earnings which could have been earned 
with reasonable diligence. 
 In addition, we are unpersuaded by Defendant's citation 
to our decision in Carden v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 850 F.2d 
996 (3d Cir. 1988).  First, the Carden court cites Ford Motor Co. 
in support of its holding.  As we have explained in the text, 
Ford Motor Co. does not support Defendant's "no mitigation-no 
backpay" argument.  Second, as we read Carden, it seems to 
support the position that a plaintiff's failure to mitigate 
damages, as with a plaintiff who has "interim earnings," results 
in a reduction in the back pay award. See id. at 1006. 
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available and paid between $5.00 and $12.00 per hour.  It set 
$8.50 per hour as an average and used it to calculate the set 
off.  In addition, the court included overtime hours in its 
calculation.  We review the district court's back pay calculation 
for an abuse of discretion. See Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 
42 F.3d 373, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1994); Robinson, 982 F.2d at 898. 
 Plaintiff argues that the district court abused its 
discretion in computing his back pay award.  He maintains that 
the back pay order is contrary to its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law.  In its findings, the court stated, 
"Defendant's Exhibit 14 and other evidence establishes that 
minimum wage jobs were available . . . ." Appendix at 91A. 
(emphasis added).  Plaintiff contends that the court was bound to 
use the minimum wage, and not the higher wage actually used, in 
reducing his back pay award. 
 The evidence indicates that a number of substantially 
similar positions were available, and those positions paid more 
than minimum wage.  Although the district court stated that 
"minimum wage" positions were available, the record supports its 
decision to use a higher wage.  We conclude that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in calculating Plaintiff's 
back pay and the set off. 
 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the district court erred 
in not awarding prejudgment interest on this award.  We turn now 
to that issue. 
B. Prejudgment Interest 
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 The determination of whether to award prejudgment 
interest in a Title VII case is committed to the sound discretion 
of the district court. See Robinson v. SEPTA, Red Arrow, 982 F.2d 
892, 897 (3d Cir. 1993).  Generally, a court of appeals will not 
overturn the district court's determination of the 
appropriateness of a prejudgment interest award absent an abuse 
of discretion. See Gelof v. Papineau, 829 F.2d 452, 456 (3d Cir. 
1987); see also Hadley v. VAM P T S, 44 F.3d 372, 376 (5th Cir. 
1995).  The district court is deemed to have abused its 
discretion only when the reviewing court is firmly convinced that 
a mistake has been made. See Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 42 
F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 Here, the district court denied Plaintiff's motion for 
prejudgment interest.  In its order the district court recited in 
relevant part: 
 IT IS ORDERED that the motion be and hereby is 
denied for the following reasons: 
 . . . . 
 2.  Interest on the back-pay and damage 
calculations is not appropriate in this case due to the 
conduct of plaintiff following [Defendant's] illegal 
employment decision . . . ; 
 3.  The conduct of plaintiff contributed to an 
inflated claim for back-pay and therefore the equities 
do not weigh in favor of awarding pre-judgment interest 
on the damage award; 
 4.  Plaintiff did not suffer from the loss of the 
use of funds during the relevant period; and 
 5.  The award of back-pay and the damage 
calculations are fair, reasonable and appropriate under 
the circumstances, without more. 
Plaintiff's Br. at 28-29.  Although the district court is not 
specific, the parties agree that the "conduct" referred to by the 
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district court is Plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages. See 
id. at 19; Defendant's Br. at 15. 
 Title VII authorizes prejudgment interest as part of 
the back pay remedy in actions against private employers. See 
Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 557 (1988).  As with the back 
pay award, prejudgment interest helps to make victims of 
discrimination whole. See Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1530 
(3d Cir. 1988).  The award of prejudgment interest is 
compensatory in nature; it serves to compensate a plaintiff for 
the loss of the use of money that the plaintiff otherwise would 
have earned had he not been unjustly discharged. See Chandler v. 
Bombardier Capital, Inc., 44 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1994); Berndt 
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc., 789 F.2d 253, 259 (3d 
Cir. 1986). 
 This court has stated, "To fulfill this [make-whole] 
purpose, prejudgment interest should be `given in response to 
considerations of fairness [and] denied when its exaction would 
be inequitable.'" Green, 843 F.2d at 1531 n.16 (quoting Board of 
Comm'rs of Jackson County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352 
(1939)) (second alteration in original).  This language has been 
interpreted as supporting a strong presumption in favor of 
awarding prejudgment interest, except where the award would 
result in "unusual inequities." See id.; Brock v. Richardson, 812 
F.2d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Barbour v. Merrill, 48 
F.3d 1270, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  Accordingly, a district court 
may exercise its discretion to depart from this presumption only 
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when it provides a justification that reasonably supports the 
departure. 
 In the present case, the district court found that the 
award of back pay alone wholly compensated Plaintiff, and that, 
because Plaintiff's conduct contributed to an inflated back pay 
claim, the equities weighed against prejudgment interest.  
Furthermore, it concluded that Plaintiff did not suffer the loss 
of the use of funds following the unlawful discharge. 
 We agree with those courts that have held that a 
plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages, alone, is insufficient 
to overcome the presumption in favor of a prejudgment interest 
award. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 
F.3d 1037, 1047-48 (7th Cir. 1994); Donnelly v. Yellow Freight 
Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 402, 411 (7th Cir. 1989).  First, 
Plaintiff's reduced back pay award reflects his failure to 
mitigate damages.  Second, even had Plaintiff met his duty to 
mitigate losses, he would not be made whole absent an award of 
some back pay.  Because Plaintiff was entitled to some back pay 
as a result of his unlawful termination, under the present 
circumstances he is entitled to prejudgment interest for the loss 
of the use of the amount included in the back pay award. 
 We find, therefore, that the district court's 
conclusion was not consistent with a sound exercise of 
discretion. 
 III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the August 8, 
1994 order of the district court awarding Plaintiff certain back 
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pay.  We will reverse the August 22, 1994 order of the district 
court denying Plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest on the 
back pay award and direct the entry of an appropriate amount. 
                        
